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553 
Digest:  Communities for a Better 
Environment v. South Coast Air Quality 
Management District 
James V. Bilek 
Opinion by Werdegar, J., with George, C.J., Baxter, Chin, 
Moreno, JJ., and Pollak, J.1 and Premo, J.2 
Issues 
1. Whether a governmental agency may use the maximum 
emissions allowed under a pre-existing government issued 
permit as the baseline in determining if an Environmental 
Impact Report is required to be produced. 
2. Whether the use of the actual environmental conditions as 
a baseline during the examination of a proposed project’s 
environmental impact will deprive the permit holder of his or her 
vested rights. 
3. Whether subsequent review of the approved proposed 
project will violate the permit’s statute of limitations. 
4. Whether an exception should be made for a company’s 
proposed project if that proposed project consists of using 
equipment already installed and subject to government permits. 
5. Whether a government agency must use a specific formula 
in its calculation of the baseline. 
Facts 
Real party in interest, ConocoPhillips, operates a refinery in 
Wilmington, CA, which produces chemical products such as 
diesel fuel, gasoline, and jet fuel.3  The defendant, South Coast 
Air Quality Management District (District), is a government 
agency responsible for the regulation of “nonvehicular air 
 
 1 Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, 
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution. 
 2 Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, assigned by the 
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 3 Cmtys. for a Better Env’t v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. 226 P.3d 985, 990 
(Cal. 2010). 
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pollution in the South Coast Air Basin . . . .”4  The plaintiffs 
include various labor organizations, individuals who live in the 
area near the refinery, and an environmental organization.5  In 
order to comply with federal and state environmental regulations 
mandating a reduction of sulfur content in diesel fuel, 
ConocoPhillips developed a plan entitled the Ultra Low Sulfur 
Diesel Fuel Project (the Diesel Project).6  Under the Diesel 
Project, ConocoPhillips planned to replace certain equipment and 
increase the use of four boilers it had maintained.7  These boilers 
were subject to permits issued prior to the state and federal 
environmental regulations and, according to the permits, were 
allowed to operate at certain maximum levels.8  ConocoPhillips 
sought approval from the District to obtain a new permit for the 
Diesel Project.9  According to the California Environmental 
Quality Act (CEQA), any project that may have significant 
environmental effects “requires a public agency to prepare an 
environmental impact report (EIR) . . . .”10  In order to determine 
if a project will significantly affect the environment, the 
government agency must compare the conditions of the 
environment prior to the project’s implementation with the 
conditions of the environment post-implementation.11  The 
environment’s state prior to the project’s implementation is 
referred to as the “baseline,” which consists of “the physical 
environmental conditions in the vicinity of the project, as they 
exist at the time . . . environmental analysis is 
commenced . . . .”12  Furthermore, CEQA guidelines permit 
government agencies to publish certain threshold levels; if a 
certain chemical emission surpasses that level, the proposed 
project will be deemed to have a significant impact on the 
environment.13  In its initial report, the District concluded that 
the Diesel Project would not have a significant impact on the 
environment, and thus did not require production of an EIR.14  
 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. at 989 (citing CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21100(a), 21151(a) (West 2010)).  “The 
purpose of an EIR is to inform decision makers and the public of the potential 
environmental impacts of a project and to identify feasible alternatives to the project and 
measures to mitigate or avoid the adverse effects.” Fed’n of Hillside & Canyon Ass’ns. v. 
City of L.A., 83 Cal. App. 4th 1252, 1258 (2000). 
 11 Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 226 P.3d at 989. 
 12 Id. (quoting CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15125(a) (2010)). 
 13 Id. at 990 n.2. 
 14 Id. at 990. 
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One of the plaintiffs’ experts opined that the Diesel Project would 
greatly affect the environment by increasing nitrogen oxide 
emissions to as much as 661 pounds per day.15  The District’s 
published threshold for nitrogen oxide emissions is 55 pounds per 
day.16  The District itself concluded the Diesel Project would 
increase nitrogen oxide levels by between 237 and 456 pounds 
per day, but, since the bulk of this increase—between 201 and 
420 pounds per day—would be caused directly by the increased 
usage of the four boilers (an increased usage within the 
maximum allowed by their permits), the District regarded the 
emissions output as below the 55 pounds per day threshold.17  
Thus, in determining the baseline, the District argued that 
because ConocoPhillips already had permits to use the boilers, its 
baseline should be the level of emissions that would occur at the 
boilers’ maximum permitted use.18  In their petition for writ of 
mandate, plaintiffs argued that the District erred in using this as 
a baseline, that substantial evidence existed to conclude that the 
Diesel Project would have a significant impact on the 
environment, and that the District should have prepared an EIR 
to determine if any measures could be taken to mitigate the 
environmental impact of the Diesel Project.19 
The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ petition and entered 
judgment for ConocoPhillips and the District.20  On appeal, the 
Court of Appeal agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that the 
proper baseline should be determined by the actual physical 
conditions, as opposed to potential conditions.21  The Court of 
Appeal further held that if the proper baseline had been used, 
there would have been sufficient evidence to show that the Diesel 
Project would have a significant impact on the environment.22  
Therefore, the Court of Appeal remanded with orders that an 
EIR be prepared by the District.23  The District and 
ConocoPhillips petitioned the California Supreme Court for 
review.24  In their argument, ConocoPhillips and the District 
contended that: (1) as ConocoPhillips had an entitlement to use 
its boilers at a certain level, the proper baseline should be those 
 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 990 n.2. 
 17 Id. at 990–91. 
 18 Id. at 991. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
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emissions created by the boilers’ maximum allowable level of 
usage; (2) if the maximum emissions allowed under the permit 
were not used as a baseline, ConocoPhillips would be deprived of 
its vested rights under the permit; (3) in allowing a challenge to 
the District’s determination, the court would violate the permit’s 
statute of limitations; (4) regardless of the above arguments, an 
exception should have been made for ConocoPhillips because its 
proposed project was simply a modification of a pre-approved 
project; and (5) the Court of Appeal’s order that an average 
annual emissions level be used as the baseline was improper.25 
Analysis 
1. What is the proper standard to establish a baseline for 
purposes of determining if a proposed project will have a 
significant impact on the environment? 
To determine if the District used an improper baseline, the 
court first turned to the relevant statutory law, particularly 
section 15125(a) of the California Code of Regulations, which 
states: 
An EIR must include a description of the physical environmental 
conditions in the vicinity of the project, as they exist at the time the 
notice of preparation is published . . . .  This environmental setting 
will normally constitute the baseline physical conditions by which a 
lead agency determines whether an impact is significant.26 
The court next examined Court of Appeal decisions ruling 
under this statute and concluded that they held that the proper 
baseline is to be established by a determination of “actual 
environmental conditions existing at the time of CEQA analysis,” 
not the conditions that could exist under an existing permit.27  
However, in its determination, the District used as its baseline 
the emissions that would occur if the boilers were running at the 
maximum capacity allowed under their permits.28  Furthermore, 
 
 25 Id. at 989. 
 26 Id. at 992 (emphasis omitted) (quoting CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15125(a)). 
 27 Id. at 992–93 (emphasis added) (citing Fat v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 97 Cal. App. 
4th 1270, 1277–78 (2002); Envtl. Planning Info. Council v. Cnty. of El Dorado, 131 Cal. 
App. 3d 350, 354, 357–58 (1982); City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Bd. of Supervisors, 183 Cal. 
App. 3d 229, 246–47 (1986); Cnty. of Amador v. El Dorado Cnty. Water Agency, 76 Cal. 
App. 4th 931, 955 (1999); Save Our Peninsula Comm. v. Monterey Cnty. Bd. of 
Supervisors, 87 Cal. App. 4th 99, 121 (2001); San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Ctr. v. Cnty. of 
Merced, 149 Cal. App. 4th 645, 658 (2007); Woodward Park Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. 
City of Fresno, 150 Cal. App. 4th 683, 693 (2007)).  These cases included factual scenarios 
in which a permit or regulatory framework allowed for higher increased activity than 
what was actually occurring. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 226 P.3d at 993. 
 28 Id. at 993. 
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the District admitted that, normally, no one boiler ran at its 
maximum capacity allowed under the permit.29  Thus, the court 
held that the District erred in using as the baseline the 
conditions that could exist if the boilers were simultaneously 
being used at full capacity.30  The court reasoned that using the 
boilers’ maximum capacity emissions is not an accurate reflection 
of the established, existing, and actual environmental conditions 
prior to the Diesel Project’s implementation, but is only a 
hypothetical determination of what could exist at any given time 
under the permits.31  By using this baseline, the court further 
reasoned, the District was producing an illusory comparison that 
would only serve to mislead the public and subvert the true 
intentions of CEQA.32 
2. Does disallowing a government agency from using the 
maximum emissions allowed under a pre-existing permit as 
the baseline in its CEQA analysis violate that permit 
holder’s vested rights? 
Despite the established case law, the District and 
ConocoPhillips argued that an exception should be made because 
ConocoPhillips possessed an entitlement to use the boilers at 
their maximum allowable capacity under the permit.33  To rule 
otherwise, according to the District and ConocoPhillips, would 
deprive ConocoPhillips of its vested rights and conflict with the 
permit’s statute of limitations.34  Under the doctrine of vested 
rights, a property owner who has been issued a government 
permit, and has substantially developed his or her property in 
reliance on the permit, has a vested right to complete 
construction and use the property consistent with the permit.35  
The court dismissed this argument, holding that any order by the 
District could not deprive ConocoPhillips of its right to use its 
boilers at their maximum allowable level.36  As the court 
reasoned, the issue is not whether ConocoPhillips has a right to 
use its boilers at their allowable level, but rather what impact 
ConocoPhillips’ proposed project, including the use of new and 
 
 29 Id.  In fact, a boiler would only run at full capacity if another boiler happened to 
be shut down. Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 994 (citing San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Ctr., 149 Cal. App. 4th at 658). 
 32 Id. (citing Envtl. Planning Info., 131 Cal. App. 3d at 538). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. (citing Russ Bldg. P’ship. v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 44 Cal. 3d 839, 845–46 
(1988)). 
 36 Id. at 995. 
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modified equipment, would have on the environment.37  Even if, 
using the proper baseline, the District determines that enough 
adverse environmental effects will result from the Diesel Project 
that it would not be approved without limits on the boilers’ 
emissions output, this would not deprive ConocoPhillips of a 
vested right because ConocoPhillips has “no vested right to 
pollute the air at any particular level.”38  Merely conditioning 
approval of a new project on controlled nitrogen oxide emissions 
in no way deprives ConocoPhillips of a vested right and does not 
contradict the terms of its permits.39  The court also stressed that 
it is always within the District’s power to simply deny permits to 
be issued for the Diesel Project if it determines that nothing 
could successfully mitigate the effects of the increased nitrogen 
oxide production, which would clearly result in no interference 
with ConocoPhillips’ rights under the permits.40  Furthermore, 
even if mitigation would require interference with Conoco-
Phillips’ vested rights, as long as the District’s initial 
investigation determined that the Diesel Project would result in 
a significant environmental impact on the area, CEQA would still 
require an EIR to be produced.41  Thus, the court concluded, even 
if an applicant’s vested rights may be interfered with, it is not an 
excuse to forgo an EIR.42 
3. Does review of an order approving a proposed project 
which entails the use of equipment subject to pre-existing 
permits violate the statute of limitations? 
ConocoPhillips and the District also argued that by allowing 
judicial review of the boiler permits the courts have violated the 
statute of limitations for such review, which is 30 or 180 days, 
depending on the type of challenge.43  The court quickly 
dismissed this argument for the same reasons stated above: 
(1) plaintiffs did not challenge the previously issued boiler 
permits, but rather they challenged the District’s approval of the 
Diesel Project; (2) challenging the type of baseline used to assess 
the Diesel Project’s environmental impact could not result in an 
order interfering with the permits; and (3) even if an order were 
 
 37 Id. at 994. 
 38 Id. (citing Sherwin-Williams Co. v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. 86 Cal. 
App. 4th 1258, 1273 (2001); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. App. 3d 293, 305 
(1976)). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 995–96. 
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given to modify the permits, that still would not preclude the 
duty the District has to produce an EIR.44  The court therefore 
held that the statute of limitations on the permits does not affect 
the rights of the plaintiffs in this case to challenge the District’s 
approval of the Diesel Project.45 
4. Should an exception be made for a company’s proposed 
project if it will require the use of equipment already subject 
to government issued permits? 
ConocoPhillips and the District argued that a long line of 
Court of Appeal decisions hold that using the maximum 
allowable emissions as a baseline is an exception to the general 
rule of using existing conditions where the proposed project is 
merely a modification of a previously approved project.46  The 
court relied on the fact that the Diesel Project would require the 
installation of new equipment, in addition to increased use of 
existing equipment, when it held that this was not merely a 
modification of a pre-existing project.47  Furthermore, Conoco-
Phillips applied for a new permit, and the District treated the 
project as a new one that was not exempt under the California 
Code of Regulations.48 
5. What is the proper method to accurately calculate the 
baseline to be used during CEQA analysis? 
Finally, the Court addressed the issue of how to properly 
calculate the baseline.49  ConocoPhillips disagreed with the Court 
of Appeal ruling that required the District to use the annual 
average nitrogen oxide emission level as its baseline.50  The court 
turned to the CEQA guidelines in section 15125, which state: 
“[T]hat the lead agency ‘normally’ use a measure of physical 
conditions ‘at the time the notice of preparation [of an EIR] is 
published, or if no notice of preparation is published, at the time 
environmental analysis is commenced.’”51 
The court expressed concern about using a rigid date for 
 
 44 Id. at 996. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id.  For a discussion on the applicability of the rule which ConocoPhillips argued 
should apply here, see Bloom v. McGurk, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 914, 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) 
(noting that where a new permit involves no change in operations “the project falls 
squarely within [CEQA’s] categorical exemption”). 
 47 Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 226 P.3d at 996. 
 48 Id.  See also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 21166, 15162, 15301 (2010). 
 49 Cmtys. for a Better Env’t., 226 P.3d at 997. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. (quoting CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15125(a)). 
Do Not Delete 3/16/2011 5:37 PM 
560 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 14:553 
 
establishing the baseline because conditions will often change 
and emissions may fluctuate rapidly.52  Additionally, according to 
the Court, using a rigid date may encourage companies to 
artificially increase their emissions use in order to establish a 
higher baseline during the review process.53  Ultimately, the 
court relied on the absence of CEQA guidelines mandating a 
precise formula be used to determine that the District (or other 
responsible governmental agency) has discretion to determine 
how the proper baseline should be calculated, as long as it is 
supported by “substantial evidence.”54  The court ordered that the 
District is not necessarily to use any exact formula, but in 
whatever formula it does use, it must compare the existing 
environmental conditions before the Diesel Project with the 
environmental conditions after the Diesel Project.55 
Holding 
The court affirmed the Court of Appeal.56  The court held 
that maximum emissions limits allowed under a permit do not 
constitute a proper baseline.57  Next, the court held that a 
company is not deprived of its vested rights under a permit it 
holds by an order to mitigate emissions created by a proposed 
project.58  A review of a proposed project, even if that review 
determines the project should be denied, in no way will affect any 
vested rights in pre-existing permits.59  Additionally, as the 
proposed project will require the installation of new equipment, 
the proposed project is not simply a modification of a prior 
implemented project and thus is not subject to an exception to 
the rule that an EIR be produced for any new project that will 
significantly affect the environment.60  Finally, the court held 
that an EIR must be produced because the Diesel Project will 
likely significantly affect the environment.61  As long as the 
District compares existing environmental conditions with those 
after implementation of the proposed project, however, it is in the 
 
 52 Id. (citing Save Our Peninsula Comm. v. Monterey Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 87 
Cal. App. 4th 99, 125 (2001)). 
 53 Id. at 997. 
 54 Id. at 997–98. 
 55 Id. at 998. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 993. 
 58 Id. at 995. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 996. 
 61 Id. at 992. 
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District’s discretion to determine how the baseline should be 
calculated.62 
Legal Significance 
The Court’s decision prevents a governmental agency from 
using the maximum emissions allowed under a permit as the 
baseline in its determination of whether or not an EIR is to be 
produced.  Thus, governmental agencies must use actual existing 
environmental conditions when determining whether an EIR 
need be produced.  The mere fact that a company has a right to 
produce a certain level of emissions under an existing permit 
does not mean it has the right to produce a comparable level of 
emissions in a new project.  The two projects are distinct, and 
any government agency contemplating the production of an EIR 
must treat them accordingly. 
 
 62 Id. at 998. 
